Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 1

January 2001

Lawyer Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age
of Globalism
Winston P. Nagan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Nagan, Winston P. (2001) "Lawyer Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age of Globalism,"
Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

ESSAY
Nagan: Lawyer Roles, Identity, and
Professional Responsibility in an Age
LAWYER ROLES, IDENTITY, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALISM
Winston P. Nagan*

132

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

PARADIGMS OF "GLOBALISM" AND LAWYER ROLES ......

134

III.

LAWYER ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND GLOBAL CRISES

136

IV.

ISSUES OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT ...................

139

V.

EMERGING LAWYER IDENTIFICATIONS, ROLES, AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ....................

141

LEGAL EDUCATION, GLOBALISM, AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY .....................

143

VI.

VII.

..................................

THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL LAW ...............

; ....

145

VIII. INTERPRETATIVE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES
OF GLOBAL LAW .................................

148

IX.

GLOBALISM AND NORMATVITY

153

X.

GLOBALISM AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING ............

155

XI.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ...........................

156

.....................

* Winston P. Nagan is a Sam T. Dell Research Scholar Professor of Law at University of
Florida Levin College of Law; Affiliate Professor of Anthropology; Director, Institute For Peace,
Human Rights and Development.,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1

[Vol. 13

I. INTRODUCTION'
Many people have an intuitive sense of globalism but great difficulty in
defining exactly what it is. The most popular and probably misleading way
of defining globalism is in terms of the essential changes in sovereign states
who are generally considered to be the members of the international or
global community. Thus globalism is sometimes defined as a process which
serves to erode traditional sovereign borders, and which opens up internal
economic activity to larger international, economic and political forces. The
meaning of globalism in the aftermath of the transformations in Eastern
Europe have emphasized the economic aspects of globalism in terms of
opening up markets that were closed or highly regulated by command
economies. Globalism is, of course, much more than this. It is a reflection
ofthe way in which the movement ofpeople, goods, services, technologies,
families and every aspect of human experience is influenced by conditions
that radically telescope the restrictions of time and space in the entire earthspace community. This vast flow of goods, services, capital and labor
across all kinds of political boundaries poses immense challenges to the
legal profession since almost every local problem might have an
international aspect to it and international problems are often localized in
their impacts. In myriad ways lawyers are required to make sense out of
these vast changes and in order to do so they are required not only to
rethink the empirical and normative boundaries of their profession, they are
required to virtually rethink the boundaries of what law is, how it is to be
taught and what standards of professionalism and moral understandings
need to be included in the emerging concepts of professionalism.
The problem of the professional responsibility of lawyers in the 21st
century is both vast and important. It is vast because there is incredible
diversity and change taking place within the profession itself, from a global
perspective. Change and diversification in short are influenced by the
conditions ofglobalism and inspire the globalization ofprofessional lawyer
roles. To provide a provisional focus to this discussion, I shall make a
threshold distinction relating to the meaning of professional responsibility.
There is the professional responsibility that is structured around the
codes of professional responsibility and focus in some depth upon certain
ethical constraints on the practice of law. This is an important question, and
certainly in a cross-cultural world, cultural perspectives about what is and
what is not ethical may differ in substantial degree. In some cultures,
bribery is a way of life, and lawyer roles are in some degree influenced by

1. This Essay was initially presented as an address to the National Democratic Lawyers
Association of South Africa (NADEL). It was delivered in Durban, South Africa in 1998. This
expanded version is for Silas Nkanunu and Templeton Mdlana who inspired it.
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it. In other cultures, bribery may be a taboo, and lawyer roles require a
rejection of such practices as a part of lawyer role expectations. In some
legal cultures, success fees or contingency fees are the sine qua non of
practice, whereas in other cultures, they may be the grounds for exclusion
from the legal profession.
Interesting as these above questions are, I am going to focus upon the
second meaning that I wish to give to the idea ofprofessional responsibility.
In this meaning, professional responsibility provokes broader and deeper
questions of the professional identity of the lawyer in the 21 st century, and
in particular, how that professional identity relates to the responsibility or
obligation to defend or enhance basic or foundational values of culture and
civil society. In short, the focus I want to emphasize is, in effect, the public
and civic policy foundations of lawyer roles, which are the institutional
foundations of the idea or ideal of the rule of law itself.2
I am going to assume that the related conceptions of public and civic
policy on the one hand, and the rule of law on the other, hold salient and
enhanced challenges for whatever meaning is included in the terms
"professional responsibility." The challenge to professional responsibility is
heightened when we consider that a concern for professional responsibility,
influenced by broader issues such as the rule of law and public/civic
responsibility must include an important educational factor. "Education"
here includes the training of law students, the continuing education of those
already admitted to practice, and even more important, a deeper and wider
understanding and appreciation of the complexity included in the disarming
phrase, "lawyer roles." The idea of lawyer roles reflects not simply the
official distinctions between practitioners and judges or different kinds of
practitioners such as attorneys, solicitors, barristers or advocates. What we
include here is what lawyers, however labeled, actually do. These roles may
include litigation and appeals, but they are broader. They include all
decisions made by lawyers in chambers or law offices. They include roles
as drafters, advisors, planners, and even socio-economic engineers. There
is also a normative component to lawyer roles. The normative aspect
reflects upon the systems of cultural and professional identifications of
lawyers. Do they identify themselves as bureaucrats, as champions, as
acolytes, as "friends" 3 or are they influenced by the basic law models of
operational systems or the prescribed values ofthe UN Charter? The values
implicated in the UN Charter include concerns for world peace and
security, human rights, development and more. These values in some

2. See Norman S. Marsh, The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept, in OXFORD
ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
3. See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.R. 29, 29.
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measure constitute the procedural and substantive foundations of the
international rule of law.
To appreciate the idea of professional responsibility in the light of rule
of law values, it would seem to be important that we know more about
what lawyers in fact, will be doing in the early phases of the 21st century.
If we can anticipate these roles adequately, we should be able to reshape
expectations of professionalism in legal education in ways that provide a
more justifiable fit for what lawyers are actually doing in the light of the
new challenges and opportunities of globalism. It is perhaps axiomatic that
at a theoretical or even unconscious level, lawyer roles are often shaped by
the implicit jurisprudence of the lawyer. Thus, one might suggest that
natural lawyers may generate a sense of idealism in the lawyer role.
Positivism, in its analytical variety, may generate a sense of stability and
focus on the conservation of law through rules and principles. Legal realism
might be seen as emphasizing the unruly world ofbehavioral indeterminacy,
and thus, generates complexities about exactly who lawyers are and what
they do. Still other theories influenced by progressive rationalism might see
the lawyer role in terms of institutional development and policy-scientific
orientations. Jurists associated with critical conceptions of inclusive
citizenship may see through law an agency well-suited to the struggle for
equality, respect and justice. However adequate these representations are
of the interplay between lawyer roles and legal theory, the one fact that has
dominated the post-Cold War world has been the fact of accelerated
globalism. This has impacted on lawyer roles as well as the adequacy of
legal theory. Indeed, from a practical point of view, it suggests the urgency
of better understanding of the scope and character of professional
responsibility in the 21 st century.
II. PARADIGMS OF "GLOBALISM" AND LAWYER ROLES
There are multiple perspectives of globalism. Indeed, some are
juridically inspired. These perspectives may most usefully be understood as
implied above, as competing or contending paradigms. Thus the UN
Charter represents one important paradigm of international constitutional
and public order. That paradigm was challenged by the Cold War and the
division of the world, in the view of the major powers, between the
capitalist-oriented free market systems, the socialist-oriented peoples'
democracies and the more diffuse but no less real, non-aligned block of
nations. The world peace through world trade movements, spearheaded by
the Trilateral Commission, envisaged a global world order under the
direction of the captains of corporate monopoly efficiency, a vision which
comprises a diffuse human rights agenda focusing on the role ofNGO's and
an enhanced role for the corporate side of civil society. In the economic
sphere a more direct competition for the global paradigm emerged in the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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North-South dialogue and the "South's" claim to a New International
Economic Order. The North-South dialogue spawned its Group of 77
nations which seemed to be pitted against an emerging block now known
as the G-7 or G-8 at last count. There are of course other "paradigms" of
world order predicated upon such prepackaged, but nonetheless arcane
ideas, as the clash of "civilizations."
As early as 1975, Professor Richard Falk, in anticipation of an
accelerated trend toward globalism, identified several contending
paradigmatic options for the world order. These paradigms are as follows:
(i) The Paradigm of World Government (Clark-Sohn), (ii) Concert of Great
Powers (Kissinger/Pentagon design), (iii) Concert of Multinational
Corporate Elites (implicit in the work of Trilateral Commission), and (iv)
Global Populism (Falk and like-minded alternative thinkers).4
In addition to these generalized models, partial models of regional world
order have emerged, such as the idea of an African renaissance in
governance and political economy, an Asian century based on selfsustaining processes of economic development and integration (sometimes
called and Asian renaissance), as well as a common market type deal for the
Americas. All these paradigms may influence how we reconceptualize law,
how as observers we redefine lawyer roles, how we educate lawyers for the
critical tasks inherent in the global paradigm itself. Lawyers will of course
influence globalism by facilitating or constraining it through the discharge
of lawyer roles. Lawyers will condition the images, symbols, narratives,
myths and normative priority of the competing global paradigms
themselves. They will influence a trend toward globalism based on the rule
of law or indeed away from that ideal. Lawyer identifications will be
challenged by the pressures of parochial localism and the challenges of
cosmopolitanism and universalist identifications. 5 Because legal practice in
general tends to have a strong "local" emphasis, it may be that the average
local practitioner in, for example, Gainesville, Florida or Stellenbosch,
South Africa may have no explicit sense of the world of global and
continental events and problems which may shape his/her pattern of
identification and the changing character of both legal practice and the
larger sense of lawyer roles and responsibilities.

4. See Richard Falk, A New Paradigmfor International Legal Studies, 84 YALE L.J. 969,
999-1015(1975). See generally RiCHAP.DFALK, PREDATORYGLOBALIZATION: ACRTIQUE (1999).
5. See Falk, supra note 4, at 999-1015.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

5

INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OFLaw,
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 13, Iss.AW2 [2001], Art. 1

[Vol. 13

III. LAWYER ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND GLOBAL CRISES

The millennium also coincides with the post cold war world. George
Bush once visualized this world as a kinder and gentler world. Bush's
optimism coincided with an unvarnished armed attack on Kuwait by Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein. The central problem posed by the attack was that
it was a clear violation of one of the core principles of international
constitutional order (UN Charter Article 2.4) which prohibits and declares
unlawful, acts of aggression. Although the cold war world was awash in
acts of "indirect" aggression or aggression through surrogates, the specific
use of armed forces to extinguish the sovereignty of an independent state
immediately raised the stakes ofthe post cold war world, as a world subject
to even the attenuated restraints of the rule of law, and the complete
rejection of even those minimal restraints.
As the Gulf War came to an end, the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia and later Rwanda presented the biggest threat to human rights
and humanitarian concerns since possibly the depredations of the Hitlers',
Stalins', and Maos' of the world. In effect, thoughtful scholars even
contemplated a "non-law" state which characterized so-called "ethnic
conflicts." At the back of the ethnic cleansing policies of the Serbian and
later Rwandan Hutu elites were challenges to the rule of law in a global
sense. If ethnic cleansing and ethnic conflict are both incomprehensible and
not amenable to the restraints of law, do we not then contemplate the
rejection ofjuridical and normative restraints of the UN Charter itself? Are
these crises really matters of global concern or are they indicators of the
limits of global concern, and global law' Is the stress on the limits a
disguised claim to parochial identifications?
As the international community and the legal profession slowly
responded to the problems of South East Europe, the ethnic conflict in
Rwanda spiraled out of control as Hutu militias systematically butchered
nearly a million of their Tutsi countrymen. These problems (and many
others) underlined the idea that the rule of law is not a national or
international luxury, but a critical restraining element in the core global
issues of peace, security, human rights and a minimal respect for
humanitarian concerns.
The crisis of South Eastern Europe and later Rwanda led to a level of
international institutional paralysis which culminated, somewhat belatedly,
in a renewed interest in the rule of law foundations of basic international
human rights and humanitarian law. The establishment of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were an important

6. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILITARY HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM

Kosovo (1999) (for a skeptical appraisal of new world order interventions).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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response to these issues, although it may fairly be said that these events and
public opinion virtually compelled action of some sort from the United
Nations Security Council. The mandate of these tribunals was limited and
precluded crimes against the peace. On the other hand, the relative success

of these institutions, renewed interest in the idea ofan international criminal
court as well as a Human Rights Court for Africa. Although the United
States strongly supported the creation and work of the Ad Hoc Tribunals,
it surprisingly opposed the passage of the Rome statute for creating the
International Criminal Court.7 In particular, it opposed the codification of
crimes against the peace (aggression). Although opposition to the Rome
statute was motivated by political factors as well as security concerns, it

was also highly influenced by the recrudescence ofthe idea of"sovereignty"
and the concern that international obligations are corrosive of this idea. In
short, positivism still influences in important ways the legal perspectives of
critical actors in the international system. Whatever the full import of these
issues, a few general considerations about globalism seem obvious from the
perspective of lawyer roles, identities and responsibilities. It seems, for
example, that the world of global events, facts and occurrences would
require that lawyer roles be more adequately defined for a more
comprehensive context and that normative values in some important degree
are inherent in the broader identification of lawyer roles and professional
identity. If lawyer roles are cohtroversial in context of war and security
matters, other areas of globalism may directly impact on lawyer roles and
responsibilities, especially in the area of development which often implicates
demographics, including population policy and reproductive freedoms. In
short, demographics impacts upon development and the capacity of states
to deliver an adequate standard of living.
The socio-political reality of globalism can thus be symbolized by
numbers and statistics. For example, the tensions between the right to life
and the right to a higher quality of life may be given a distinctive
perspective when it is considered that every day 365,000 babies are born in
the world. Ninety percent of these babies are born in poor, underdeveloped
countries. Notwithstanding the scope of global poverty over 2 billion
people world-wide have significantly improved their standard of living over
the past ten years. India, a country long seen as an economic development
basket-case has the world's largest middle class (200 million). However,
there are still are 750 million who live in dire poverty. China with a
population of 1,273 million people has one-fifth of the earth's population.
7. Overriding the criticisms, Mr. Clinton signed the Treaty of Rome on December 31,
2000, several hours before the New Year's deadline, set by the United Nations. See US Signs
Treaty For World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al.
8. See China Population Information and Research Center (CPIR) (visited on Mar. 18,

2001) <http://www.cpirc.org.en/eindex.htm>.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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And finally, in this regard, it is estimated that in 1804 the world's
population stood at 1 billion. In 1927, it was estimated to stand at 2 billion.
In 2027, it is projected to increase to about 8 to 9 billion.9
The economic and political foundations of global society clearly require
the search for an appropriate "developmental" formula or paradigm.
Indeed, there is a growing realization that development, population control,
democracy, as well as economic liberalization may contribute to progressive
social development. These and other global indicators may be a critical
component of the promise of peace and dignity on a global basis. These
issues have an indirect impact on the new emerging markets model of
development. This particular model presents very distinctive challenges for
lawyer roles and responsibilities. What role must lawyers play in the neoliberal economy of emerging markets, or development in general? It should
be noted that emerging markets actually require many components of law
including basic fundamental institutions of private and public law, if these
emerging market models of development are to be given a practical,
coherent emphasis. Thus, for illustration, the emerging markets of Africa
confront the problems of instability and endemic violence, the problems of
food and resource scarcity, ubiquitous poverty and disease, and the specter
of "failed" or corrupt states on the one hand and the discernible trend in
emerging and rising democratization with nearly half the continent's
governments having been elected. The emerging markets model will not
work in the former situation. It may work in the latter contexts.
The emerging markets model has in fact had a developmental impact.'0
Economic progress is being made; economic growth is discernable; and per
capita income is also on the rise in many parts of the world. However, even
more importantly, the lackluster effort to make a free market system out of
the Commonwealth of Independent States has seen a renewed interest in
Africa as a potential, emerging market. The African market of 700,000,000
(an estimate 1 billion after 2000) suggests an important arena of both
economic expansion and integration, driven by the major global economic
forces. These interests and developments coincide with what some see as
an incipient African, or even global Renaissance. These terms are used in
the sense of broadening and sustaining the boundaries of respect and

9. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT AND PEOPLE: NEO LiBERALISM AND GLOBAL
(1999) (for a skeptical appraisal of the economic foundations of neo-liberal "globalism").
10. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Real GDP Growth Around the World (%) (visited Dec.
1,2000) <http://www.eiu.com/countrydata/281277.asp>. According to the Economist Intelligence
Unit's assessment of"Real GDP growth around the world, Sub Saharan Africa "will be the fastest
growing region in the world." See id This will be due mainly to higher commodity prices. See id
Mozambique is predicted to be the fastest growing economy in the "world" in 2000. See id.
Botswana and Angola are also predicted to have rapid growth. See id. The Ugandan GDP is
predicted to average 6.6% in 2000. See id.
ORDa
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dignity. This kind of renaissance reflects a preference for an African
democracy that includes the demand and search for structures of
governance that are (i) accountable, (ii) transparent, (iii) responsible, and
(iv) humane. It reflects a more rational and responsible role for both State
and non-State agents ofdecision-making. These include a balance between
private and public sector economic ordering, the strengthening of civil
society and the rule of law, and important, the evolving public and private
institutionalization of humanitarian precepts and human rights culture. In
all of these emergent conditions, it cannot be said that either globalism or
localism is an unqualified "good" or "bad" thing. It is in fact a world order
challenge and important to lawyer roles and professionalism.
However, it is unclear whether the emerging markets development
approach implicit in the concept of globalism is the most sound approach
to development as such. For example, does it promote democratic
governance, and social responsibility as a sustainable emerging trend? If we
are uncertain that this is an emerging trend, what is the role of lawyers in
facilitating such a trend? What normative guidance and operational
practices can lawyers provide to enhance the interests of global civil
society? What is the role of law reform in enhancing respect for constitutive
and responsible authority? Perhaps what is implicated here is an expanded
vision of the rule of law, and the role of lawyers in the development
processes. In short, lawyers may be indispensable for development and for
the emergence of more humane structures of world order.
IV. ISSUES OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

The challenges of globalism to lawyer roles, legal education and
professional responsibility are often indicated in harsh reality scenarios, as
well as the temptations of idealistic visions of substantive and procedural
justice. African public order and development potentials present just such
a challenge. Let us consider briefly the issues posed by African development
and related harsh global realities.
One of the most tragic legacies that modern history has bequeathed to
Africa is that its flesh and blood was the cornerstone of Africa's global
salience, as human bodies became a critical factor of production and
foundation for the capitalization of the "West." Without the coerced export
of its human capital during the period of slavery, African trade is now but
a minor part of the volume and value of world trade. Thus in 1996, the
world trade in goods and services stood as some 6 trillion USD but Africa's
portion of world trade was a fraction of this number. Americans, it is said,
have 2.8 trillion USD invested abroad, and foreigners own some 3.3. trillion
USD of U.S. assets. The world's largest corporations (500) received during
this period some 3.2 trillion USD in revenues and some 158 billion USD in
profits. In 1996 the USD direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa totaled
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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a mere 4.9 billion USD and purchased some 16.4 billion USD worth of
African goods, 70% of which was mainly crude oil. This may be compared
with the reality that half of the people of sub-Saharan Africa suffer from
illiteracy, lack drinking water, have no health care, and live on less that
$1.00 per day. Africa's total debt is 26 billion USD which in global terms
is a paltry debt, and yet it stultifies African development initiatives." Even
the much publicized US-Africa Trade bill, which talks of making Africans
partners in prosperity obscures the reality that the under-developed world
starts with a substantial level of economic disadvantage or
disempowerment. It is, I suspect, difficult to have an enduring partnership
if the one partner starts out with a tremendous handicap.
Lawyers may be critical "engineers" in the restructuring of command,
corrupt and inefficient economies. This is because governance that honors
a minimal rule of law concept will prescribe rules for transparency,
accountability and responsibility. These "values" are critical for working,
effective markets. How are such economies in fact being reorganized? In
other words what exactly will be the role of lawyers in the new vision of
global economic order? The emphasis on lawyer roles in development
should not obscure the challenge for lawyer roles for other problems
inherent in the concept of globalism. These are listed for the sake of brevity
as follows:
* Law and Global apartheid or global poverty (development, poverty,
income distribution, economic equity, population policy, etc.)
* Law and the Global Public Health Crisis (HIV/AIDS)
* Law, emerging markets and the trend toward "harmonization"
• Law and Proliferation and threat of nuclear arsenals
• Law and the global war system (arms race, armed conflict, ethnic
conflict, etc.)

11. See Jubilee 2000 Coalition, A Debt Free Startfor a Billion People (visited May 16,
2000), <http://www.jubilee2000nw.org/debtfacts/html>. According to the fact sheet:
Africa spends four times as much on debt repayment as she does on healthcare.
Every African man, woman and child owes the developed world $357 (USD).
Every person in the global South owes about $300 (USD) to foreign creditors.
There are 225 billionaires in the world today who have a combined wealth of
more than a trillion dollars. That is more than the annual income of half of the
poorest of the world's population (about 2.5 billion people). Depending on what
figures are used, between 1972 and 1992, borrowing countries paid back $227
billion to $302 billion more than they borrowed - yet their debt burden
continued to grow. In 1997 the rich countries lent 8 billion to the poorest
countries, while these countries repaid $8.2 billion.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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* Law and basic human rights (the epidemic of gross abuse of human
rights and human atrocity)
• Law and global constitutional order
* Law and the crisis of the rule of law (failed states, corrupt states, drug
controlled states, terrorists states, garrison states, authoritarian states,
totalitarian states). 2
V. EMERGING LAWYER IDENTIFICATIONS, ROLES,
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Let me return to the local and global context of emerging lawyers roles.
The central challenge for lawyers is the legal truth, which is also a political
truth, that all legal matters that count, just as all political matters that count,
are essentially local. That is to say, they are located somewhere in a finite
event manifold of space and time. The abstractions, "time" and "space" are
especially relevant to changing concepts of lawyer roles. Globalism cannot
happen without a comprehension of time and space. The 20th century has
witnessed a steady erosion of, for example, territorial ideas about
"jurisdiction" because of the influence of modem communications and
transportation technologies. The compression of time and space now comes

under the influence ofthe internet and cyberspace. Practical effects include
world-wide near instant communication, the growth of internet commerce
and more. These all trench on traditional legal ideas which are conditioned
by "space" and "time." However, the conditions and events that shape legal
responses that used to be purely local are now also conditioned by facts and
events of multi-State or transnational significance. Thus, the application of
global human rights norms find affirmation in proceedings often involving
finite legal actors who claim, respond, decide, and appraise in situations
that are local. Even the policies tied to structural adjustment as a condition
of economic assistance emerge from distant global fora, but have vast
localized consequences. Stated very broadly, the central feature and
challenge for lawyers is how to understand the global to local impact of
legally relevant events, transactions, and occurrence which often arise in
instances of specific application. Lawyers must also appreciate the impact
of localized, on-the-ground decisions on the larger international and global
environment. One of the important legacies of this trend is the emergence
of human rights and humanitarian law. Perhaps global "law" is in effect an

agent of change for local law. Here lawyers might perform a kind of
midwife function, connecting for the purpose of giving birth to new law,

12. See generallyMOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
(1979); RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989); Winston Nagan, Nuclear
Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of the Millennium, 24 YALE L.J. 485, 485
(1999).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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promising vistas of international justice firmly rooted in our comparative
histories, traditions, modes of cognitive insight which generate a renewal
of our theories and methods of inquiry as well as our standards ofpractical
intervention. We must also provide the technical mechanisms for grounding
global perspectives and operations in concrete situations, and appraising the
impact and consequences of such legal interventions on the larger global
environment.
Doubtless lawyer roles in the 21 st century and the sense of professional
responsibility that accompanies these roles will be influenced by whatever
meaning we ascribe to globalism and global law. Practitioners who are
either in private practice, private industry, or the public service may be
marching headlong into the interstices of globalism without more explicit
realization that their local roles are in fact subject to changes. If a
practitioner, for a moment, tried to step back and observe the routines that
are followed on a day-to-day basis, the practitioner will probably be
astounded at the volume of problem-solving demands to which he/she has
to respond. He/she may even be more astonished that what he/she delivers,
or fails to deliver for that matter, involves the distribution or nondistribution of the valued things in society, and more fundamentally, the
values we causally label "human dignity" and "respect." Behind these
abstractions there is a social reality of how lawyers interface with the larger
social context to reproduce cultures which are highly-influenced by both
national values and those that lie at the heart of the international system as
a whole, including the commitment to human rights on a global basis. In
short, it may be that, however direct or indirect our practical legal
interventions are in form of advocacy and representation or in the form of
adjudicatory responses, lawyer roles are more normatively sensitive to
international ideas of shared respect,justice and freedom. The lawyers roles

are emerging in some degree as part of a shift from the Westphalian
(sovereignty dominated) model of international law to a much more fluid
context in which many actors influence the system in addition to the state.
As suggested, this awareness may not always be obvious. In the case,
for example, of South Africa the architects of apartheid wanted to rigidly
separate the substance and process of the South African law from the
concern for the normative standards of international justice. However, the
transformation of that country is reflected in South Africa's new
Constitution, (a product of struggle and sacrifice) which explicitly seeks to
make the connection to global standards and values. In doing so, it says a
great deal about how lawyers are to identify and shape their roles to
adequately respond to the challenges of globalism and the ideas and
challenges of international justice.
Educating students not simply in "international law" or "comparative
law," but in the larger context of "globalism" may in the future be an
important challenge to professional competence and training. For example,
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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every practical lawyer knows that in order to practice commercial law
effectively, one must know something about commerce. To practice family
law, one must know something about families. To practice administrative
law effectively, one must know something about bureaucratic culture. To
practice constitutional law effectively, one must have an understanding of
the structure and process of governance. It may be similarly said that in
today's world (where the flow of goods, services, statutes, and all other
legally valued things cuts across State and national lines in terms of speed,
volume, and distribution that would have been unheard of a decade ago),
the need to understand the specialized features of global society, its political
underpinnings, and its legal structures of authority and control - be they
formal or informal - is becoming an indicator ofprofessional competence.
In short, lawyering must now take into account the entire process of
interdependence, and in some degree inter-determination, of global
conditions which are shaping the law of the 21 st century and which in turn
is being shaped and directed by the law thus generated. Of course, law has
never been neutral with regard to the ends it seeks to secure. Whether
interdependence means a progressive realization of the most foundational
values of international justice, is by no means assured. Globalism is much
an arena of conflict and challenge as the Cold War was an arena of conflict
and challenge to the Superpowers and their Surrogates. It is a central arena
of conflict and challenge to lawyers.
VI. LEGAL EDUCATION, GLOBALISM, AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

One of the central issues of legal education in the law schools as well as
matter of continuing professional obligation, is the globalization of the
curriculum. W. Michael Reisman states that many of the social
arrangements we think of as quintessentially domestic in this country are
inextricably interwoven with complex process in other countries and
regions of the globe. 3 Consider: our security system, our politicaleconomic system: the search to fund and retain external markets for our
products; our dependence on the national resources without which an
advanced industrial, science-based civilization cannot survive: our health
system; our conceptions of fundamental morality... even "domestic law"
courses can no longer be understood adequately - whether for descriptive
or practical professional purposes - without an understanding of the
organization and dynamics of the international system. 4

13. See Michael Reisman, Designing Curricula: Making Legal Education Continuously
Effective and Relevant for the 21st Century, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 831, 831-58 (1986-1987).
14. Id.
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There are large scale implications in this challenge. For example, there
is the challenge of"transnational comprehensiveness" in the teaching ofthe
law. Do we need more "international law courses"? Should all our existing
courses be subject to revisions that account for the complexities of multistate law or law on a "horizontal plane"?" In other words, must we
radically revise, for example, how we teach the law of sales to account for
the International Convention on the Sale of Goods, or must we create a
new course based on this latter instrument? How much specific
international or transnational content should be added to a traditional
(state-centered) private international course? The short but precise answer
is that almost every course in the curriculum of any law school to a greater
of lesser degree has a transstate multi-state, transnational dimension to it.
Globalization may have to be given a critical curriculum presence by the
willingness of"domestic" law teachers to revise their domestic law courses
with a sensitivity to the law of multi-state problems.
If realism demands that law school curriculum be more global, it must
confront powerfully received ideas, often a part of the implicit
jurisprudence of both scholars and practitioners that law and the state are
essentially identical. The identification of law with the state has always had
technical difficulties with the law ofmultiple states (both public and private
international law). Indeed a distinguished jurist once suggested that if
international law really were law, it would also be the vanishing point of
legal theory. Of course, an emerging paradigm of global law may be unclear
and not intuitively as appealing as the Westphalian/Austinian model of law
and state.'6 However literature in World Order studies moves significantly
in the direction of global law, building on Judge Jessup's idea of
"transnational law" as distinct from state centered international law." The
author's own work on the interrelations of public and private international
law suggests that they are indispensable and complimentary components of
world public order or global law. 8 A practical gloss on these ideas is the
recognition that in general the sources of state law rest largely on statute
and precedent. The sources of international law as indicated in Article 38
of the statute of the International Court of Justice are much broader, and
correspondingly subject to controversy.

15. By law on a horizontal plane we refer to the still largely decentralized nature of the
international constitutional system. It is often suggested that the basis of the system as it involves
"sovereigns" is that it works on the principle of reciprocal tolerance. In terms of the U.N.
Charter's practice, this incorporates the idea of the good faith obligation to cooperate to achieve
the purposes of the U.N.
16. See generally Richard Falk, supra note 4, at 999-1015.
17. See PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-16 (1956).
18. See Winston P. Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict: A Systematic Appraisal of
Traditionaland Contemporary Theory, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 343-545 (198 1).
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The sources ofinternational global law which includes international law
and their relative weight in legal discourse or decision-making contexts may
be a fertile source of broadening the "authority" basis for the interpretation
of the law in general. It may also be an important challenge to juridical
creativity and innovation in the use of extensive sources of authority not
always found in conventional state law sources.
From the practical lawyers' perspective, developments through United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the
Hague Conference on Private International Law represent developments
that are more congruent with specialized areas of law than the general
categories of "international" or "comparative" law. To illustrate, the legal
instruments developed through the Hague Conference include conventions
covering areas such as the form of testimony dispositions (1961),
recognition of adoption decrees (1965), foreign service of documents in
civil and commercial issues (1965), recognition of foreign judgments
(1971), taking evidence abroad (1970), recognition of divorces (1970),
traffic accidents (1971), products liability (1973), recognition ofmarriages
(1978), marital property (1978), trusts (1985), child abductions (1980)
agency (1978) and much more. Further examples include, UNCITRAL's
conventions such as the UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
(1978), the UN Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods (1980), the
UN Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International
Promissory Notes (1994), the UN Convention on the Liability of Operators
of Transport Terminals in International Trade (1991), the UN Convention
on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit (1998). In
addition, UNCITRAL's model codes covering International Commercial
Arbitration (1985), International Credit Transfers (1992), Procurement of
Goods, Construction Services, etc. (1995), Cross Border Insolvency (1999)
and Electronic Commerce (1991) are but an indication of the specific
challenges globalism represents for curriculum development, continuing
legal education and the basic issues of enhanced lawyer competency in an
age of globalism.' 9
VII. THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL LAW
Does legal structure have a way of shaping or defining functions or
more generally legal "outcomes" of legal interventions or even the nature
of legal discourse? Does the structural image of law preempt the particular
law-view orjurisprudential perspective? Does structure in short determine
or shape the juridical paradigm, or does form track function? These
questions are indeed fundamental. They imply further questions about the
19. See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS

(195 1-1988) (1988).
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basic cognitive processes of what law is and how it is communicated. Do
our "forms" of thinking determine what we observe, how we observe, and
how we respond to what we observe in law? Globalism may mandate that
we give more attention to maintaining the distinction between theorizing
"about" law, which reflects the observers external point of view, and the
internal participants "of' law perspective. It underscores the value of the
external perspective for understanding and teaching "globalism."
In terms of conventional or "ordinary law," there is in fact a given, and
practically accepted paradigm of law. The average practitioner uses this
paradigm almost intuitively to help in shaping the lawyer role and the
attendant conceptions of professional responsibility. By ordinary law, we
refer to the Austinian influenced paradigm of legal formalism.2" The
distinguished Austrian socialist, Karl Renner, suggested that legal forms
such as "contract" or "liability" or "property" are a structural constant in
any legal system. However, the content of the form might be variable and
even radically changed by changes in perspectives (ideological) or changes
in the material and technological conditions of social organization.2 '
The form of conventional law is as indicated in large measure the
Austinian paradigm. The Austinian model has been the subject of a vast
critique and significant modification, but its structure appeals to a form of
conventional scientific perspective, viz., that law must come from a finite
source, that it must be a form of intelligible communication and it must
have the backing of organized coercion. These practical elements found a
comfortable "structural" form which in turn had a powerful intuitive appeal.
Indeed, distinguished jurists have described it as simply the conventional
law-view. The view posits a source of law (the sovereign); it posits a
community of those "in the habit of obedience," and it posits a sanction for
those who break the obedience habit, it finally posits a system of
communication (top-down) in the form of"commands." The difficulties of
grounding "authority" or "validity" in "constitutional law" was finessed by
definition. Constitutional law was simply a special form of morality. The
challenge of international law was perhaps even sharper. It was also
deemed to be a special form of moral imperative rather than law properly
defined. As noted earlier, the positivist view of international law was that
it would also be the "vanishing point" of legal theory. The beauty, or shall
we say the aesthetic, of the conventional Austinian framework lies in its
utter simplicity. Its durability as an intellectual and juridical artifact lies in
an uncluttered simple conceptual form.
The problems of the model manifested themselves in the theory and
practice of both international law and constitutional law. In international
20. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78-96 (196 1).
2 1. See KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
238-56 (0.Kahn-Freund ed. & Agnes Schwarzs trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.1949).
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law positivism influenced the generation of elaborate, alternative or
modified structures of international law itself. Two dominant, and indeed
elegant, structural models emerged that deeply divided as well as influenced
law. The models were economically styled
the development of international
"monist" and "dualist."22 The monist model seemed to postulate a
"criterion" of validation in a conceptual construct that was "meta statal."
The assumption was that there "existed" a meta statal "imperative" that
determined when, for example, a state was a state, and thus the monist
theory had some constitutive properties built into it. The dualist version
provided a more anarchic structure for international law by rooting all law
making competence in the nation-state (sovereign). Since the sovereign
might consent to some limitations, withhold consent or withdraw consent
already given, international law could be predicated upon formal and
informal agreements and understandings.
The question is, how does globalism impact upon these models? How
do these models constrain the empirical and normative challenges of
globalism? Ifwe conceive of legal theory as in part an inquiring system, do
these models limit or enhance legal inquiry? It is obvious that the very large
and complex social process mosaic of world order includes not only states,
but international and regional organizations, private armies of various levels
of competence and capacity, vast corporate enterprises and an even vaster
complex of non-governmental civil society associations as well as the
individuals who constitute the larger global community. These social facts
may require that the implicit state-centered view we hold of law be
transformed into a global law whose boundaries and structures are still in
the unfolding stage.23

22. Theories of "monism" and "dualism" have been a critical part of the evolving
"constitutional" discourse of modem international law. See generally HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-94 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966); see also [AN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990); MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 1991). In the United Kingdom the theories of monism and dualism have been loosely
identified with the theories of "transformation" or incorporation relationship between domestic
law and international law. Id The "transformation" theory holds that international law transforms
domestic law, but they are two separate and distinct systems. See id On the other hand the
"incorporation" theory holds that international law is part of domestic law without a ratifying
procedure. See Trentex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 581; see
also Maclaine Watson v. Dep't of Trade & Indus., [1989] 3 All ER 523 (accepting the
incorporation doctrine). Human rights litigation has added to the force of the incorporation
doctrine. See MURRAY HUNT, UsING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS 25 (1998).
23. PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNEMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 419 (1990). According to
Allott:
International law has been the primitive law of an unsocial international society.
Itself a by-product of that unsocialization, it has contributed to holding back the
development of international society as society. Failing to recognize itself as a
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Multi-state/transnational law may indeed be structurally more horizontal
than vertical. More realistically, there are simply multiple trajectories of
law-making, law applying and law-enforcing processes. In loose but
convenient formulation, we are dealing with the so-called global to local to
global nexus. These connections have horizontal, vertical, and other
trajectories. This kind of structural complexity will have a critical impact
upon conventional methods ofboth teaching and inquiry about law and law
conditioned processes. In this context, the good news is that the one
dimensional paradigm of top-down, hierarchical law is no longer as
professionally interesting as it apparently once was. Law operating in planes
of multiple intersecting trajectories does represent an impressive challenge
to professional competence in theory and practice. An important insight
into the structure of the law is indicated by the distinguished legal
anthropologist, Leopold Pospisi 24 who showed that multiple lawgenerating processes may exist in the same state or body politic. Each of
these processes would have distinctive criteria that make them relatively
discrete. Simultaneously they have points of important intersection and
interaction with each other. What therefore seems to be an ostensibly single
legal system upon proper investigation may in fact disclose multiple spheres
and levels of legal systematics. These ideas suggest that the law in context
idea be greatly extended to the law in global context idea. In the following
section we seek to tease out these implications in the context of the
challenges to legal "meaning," legal interpretation and the relevance of an
interdisciplinary sensitivity.
VIII. INTERPRETATIVE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES
OF GLOBAL LAW

The perspective of"globalism" necessarily expands the definition oflaw.
This will influence how law is interpreted. Thus the methods of
construction, interpretation, as well as the authoritative sources of the
"law," all conspire to produce challenges to the appropriate boundaries of
our discipline. This could inspire us to rethink the very empirical and
normative foundations of domestic law from a global perspective. For
example, global law could influence a trend that requires "interpretation"
in terms of what is usefully knowable about communications theory which
considerably broadens the theory and method of law based

society, international society has not known that it has a constitution. Not
knowing its own constitution, it has ignored the generic principles of a
constitution.
Id.
24. See LEOPOLD PosPisiL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
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communications. This in turn may influence what is conventionally labeled
"interpretation." It may also stress an approach to law that is more
horizontal than hierarchal, making more complex the weight to be given to
different sources of authority in particular cases. Globalism also broadens
the context of law. If that context is socially constructed, it may stress
interdisciplinary skills in our efforts to improve, as responsibly as possible,
the "narrative" of global law.
International lawyers have long grappled with the problem of"hard" and
"soft" sources of law. The phenomenon has in part been triggered by the
communications revolution itself. Resolutions, declarations, directives flow
from a vast aggregate of national, regional and global institutions. To some
extent they are expectation-creating communications. Some are formulated
with the precision of legal precepts and generate authoritative support in
preexisting legal precepts or in the weight and seriousness with which they
are received in authoritative fora, or more generally in public opinion.
These kinds of signs and symbols may gravitate to general acceptance in the
relevant professional and specialist discourses. Sometimes these precepts
backed by some form of "authority" and "acceptance" may find
confirmation in formal institutions of law making or in informal but
effective fora. Sometimes the acceptance of such communications that are
policy specific, supported by an authority-signal and by some form of
controlling animus, has the capacity to create law in a functional sense. This
kind of insight suggests that, however, useful the typologies of hard and
soft law are, or however broad the boundaries of Article 38 of the
International Court of Justice statute are, we could benefit from a more
coherent perspective about the relationship of communications theory to
the process of global law making and application.
Lawyers in the international law arena have been keenly aware that we
are no longer dealing with the sources of international law, but the sources
of a (local to global) global law paradigm. This has been expressed as a
form of disenchantment even with the "traditional" sources of international
law as being perhaps too narrow a basis for marshaling the sources of
authority of global or transnational law. However, as has been earlier
indicated, a return to the basis of general communications theory might
provide a better multi-level, multi-disciplinary framework for meeting this
challenge in both theory and practice. 25 The general model of
communications theory asks a series of sequential questions:

25. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967); Winston P. Nagan, Law and Post-ApartheidSouth Africa, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 399, 399-451 (1989).
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Who?
Communicates what?
About what?
Through what channel?

To whom?

With what result?2 6
With what effect?
As applied to global
follows:
Communicators
from
Global
Community

law the model may be graphically illustrated as
Policy or
Prescriptive content
Authority signal
Controlling Intention I

Target Audience
in
Global
Community

This general model has been applied to the interpretation of agreements and
world order, as well as to add insight to the question of how global law is
functionally made and applied. In the author's article, "Law and PostApartheid South Africa,"" this approach was used to provide some
coherence to the flow of communications relating to black expectations of
change as found in the Petition of Right, the Freedom Charter, the UDF
Declaration, etc. This model provides a good fit for understanding the
impact of the modem communications revolution (the intemet for example)
on global law. This approach, however, implies a greater appreciation of
law in context and the interdisciplinary aspect it implies.
This kind of perspective about law as a process of communication has
vast implications for how one describes and uses all possible "sources" of
law at any level of inquiry. Indeed, the model throws light upon a neglected
aspect of human interaction, viz., that interaction is in substantial measure

a communicative enterprise. These communications often involve normative
or prescriptive elements, they include value-variables and they contain
coded signs and symbols of both authority and expectations of coercion. It
is perhaps this core insight that has influenced legal anthropologists to
26. The revolution in human communications technologies is ofcentral importance to lawyer
roles, identities and emerging standards of professionalism. See generally HARVEY SAPOLSKY
RHONDA CRANE, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FuTURE (1992);
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WrHouT BOUNDARIES: ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A

GLOBAL AGE (Fl. M. Noam ed., 1990); FRANCIS CAIRNCRoSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE
COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES (1997). A recent paper Lloyd S.
Etheredge presented at Columbia University (May 10, 1999) provides a specific overview of
developments relating to the tnternet and globalism: "The Internet and World Politics: Unleasing
a Potential For Human Rights."
27. See generally Nagan, supra note 25, at 399.
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explore the empirical foundations of small group law or the "law" of micro
social relationships.2 ' But the global perspective also is replete with
complex communicative processes which have normative or prescriptive
force of some sort, designate communications about desired goods,
services, honors and indeed basic "values"; and contain coded symbols of
authority and control to define expectations of conservation and change.
The micro and macro implications, therefore, of a more functional design
for a contextualized vision of law-making as a process of communication
collaboration and conflict has an immense potential impact on how we
reconstruct law in an age of globalism.
When we refocus our lens about the future ofprofessional responsibility
from structure to function, we encounter several important matters of
substance. First. the "pre" structural context of law encounters the unruly
world of global fact, and the problems generated by that world, some of

which demand legal responses of some sort. The systematic articulation and
understanding of the legal problems of global reach, which demand the
Practitioner's attention, will require a refined and sophisticated form of
interdisciplinary theory and method. The focus on decision-making and
policy in an era of globalism permits a sharper emphasis on such issues as
the relevance of context and more specifically the contextual location or
mapping of problems that require some sort of legal intervention. The
problem of what a legal or potential problem is, is a major issue for theory
and practice and it is also a critical component of the multi disciplinary
dimension of the delineation of context and the outcomes of context which
are the problems to which law must respond.
The discipline of focusing on the problems which demand or require
authoritative and controlling decision-making interventions serves to place
important limitations and potentials to enhance both scholarship and
professionalism. Probably the most important element that problems
provide to legal culture from a theoretical point of view is the principle of
realism and relevancy. When the cliche "relevancy" is invoked it is usually
invoked as an anti-intellectual, crude limitation on inquiry. But in fact, when
we tie realism to problems we find that we know very little about problems
or indeed the problem of how one determines what a problem is. Even
more important, the idea of being able to anticipate or predict problems
before they happen could be one of the most important components of

28. See DAVID FUNK, GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSITION AND PRACTISE 1 (1998); W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999); see also Walter 0. Weyrauch, Unwritten

Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASHINGTON & LEE L. REV. 1211, 1211-42 (1999); Calum
Carmichael, Gypsy Law and Jewish Law, 45 AM. J.COMP. L. 69, 269 (1997); Walter 0.
Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" of "Constitution" of a Small Group, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 49 (1971);
Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen Bell, Autonomous Law Making: The Case ofthe "Gypsies," 103
YALE L.J. 323 (1993).
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thoughtful scholarly inquiry that is informed by high intellectual standards
of professionalism. The particular slant that realism and relevancy in terms
of orientation give to law in a global sense is that it focuses on the
unsettling dynamic aspect of law, that is to say, that law as decision is a
response to problems that actually arise or maybe reasonably anticipated
will arise out of the relevant community context.
No less important to the task of lawyering maybe the focus on the
indices of decision-making interventions, in particular the "conditions" of
decision-making. This too may expand our focus from legalism's reliance
on logical syntactical modes of expression and appraisal, to those that focus
cross-culturally on such factors as social and professional class, cultural
orientation, personality predispositions and conditions of crises which may
require interdisciplinary skills to meaningfully appreciate the conditions that
shape lawyer roles and lawyer conditioned interventions. A still further
concern or interest which may implicate the role of lawyers in this context
is the effort to understand the consequences for public order of lawyer
interventions. These understandings, imperfect as they may indeed be, cry
out for tools and skills of appraisal that are in part interdisciplinary.
One of the important problems posed by partial "law-and" models is that
by taking in a selective slice of social organization the consequences of
legal or policy decision-making interventions may in fact be astigmatic or
myopic since these partial, cognitive and methodological procedures are
faced with the disciplinary dilemma of too much exclusion, or if they
become too inclusive it is because they take in too much and therefore
eviscerate the coherence their approach brings to legal analysis or legal
inquiry. Managing a legal context for legal inquiry is therefore a complex
business.
Those who emphasize a law and economics approach may have to
confront this dilemma. One of the key concerns is the issue of how much
economic reductionism law can absorb without significant distortion. This
issue has emerged in the form of whether a law and economics approach
can digest certain non-economic "values." I am uncertain whether at the
back of the economic foundations of the law model there is no testable

generalized model of social organization. Possibly this model is well
expressed somewhere. If it is there, perhaps it might look something like
this: "Human beings purposefully seek to maximize wealth through
institutions based on material and technological resources." The basic thrust
of this model might be that people maximize wealth to make more wealth.
It is of course possible that they maximize wealth for other reasons.
Perhaps they want "power." Perhaps they want to maximize their
"affective" experiences; perhaps they want to improve their professional or
educational opportunities; their health and well being; perhaps they need
wealth to promote "God." Perhaps these and other objectives might deeply
influence what wealth they seek to maximize, how to maximize it and
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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where to draw the line. It may of course also be suggested, just to
complicate matters, that these other non-economic values may be used to
generate wealth. That is to say, we may use power to leverage wealth, or
skill or education or social position or even religion. In other words, the
conception of "values," i.e. what is desired may be much broader then the

scheme of value assumptions implicit in the model of the social process
implied in some forms of legal economic inquiry. Thus values and the
processes they include suggest that the foundations of "political/social
economy" are immeasurably more complex thanimplied in this model. This
insight hopefully suggests that the very idea ofcontextuality, its inclusivity,
its systematics, its amenability to effective mapping onto legal/policy
processes remain both vital and controverted. It is an important challenge
to how lawyers are educated and how effectively a sense ofsocial/economic
realism may be successfully brought into the processes oflegal inquiry and
legal intervention.29
IX. GLOBALISM AND NORMATIVITY

The international or multi-state emphasis also brings into play a level of
"normative" discourse that is far from any concept of "neutral" principles
which may still deeply influence -domestic law courses. In fact, the
international constitution is not value neutral. Its major purposes (imperfect
as they may be in precise prescription and application) are built around
several critical "keynote" concepts which seek to secure peace, security,
basic human rights and responsible eco-social progress. If interpretation or
reasoned elaboration partakes ofthe wine of globalism, it will ingest a very
extensive "normative" agenda that stands in contrast or represents a
challenge to a value-free or partially value-free legal culture. To illustrate
this I abstract the delineation of six keynote concepts embedded in the UN
Charter. They are as follows:

29. This is an issue that has an interesting parallel in human rights law. Article 17(1) of the
Universal Declaration holds that, "Everyone has a right to own property." See G.A. Res. 217(111),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Is this an unlimited universal right? Of course not, Article 17(2)
holds that "no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his property." What does this mean? Does the
term "arbitrarily" refer to all the other rights in the Declaration in the sense that property can be
limited if limitation is to preserve the other rights in the instrument? Can we know what property
means without knowing the content and structure of its limitation? Does the same principle apply
to "wealth maximization?" There is a great deal of acceptance of interdisciplinary perspectives
in law and practice. But I would suggest that the systematic employment of these perspectives in
both education and practice is not a goal that is presently realized. The methodological objective
here is, of course, to move from "law and" to an inclusive interdisciplinary, "law is" paradigm.
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The opening of the preamble expresses the first standard - that the
Charter's authority is rooted in the perspectives of all members of the
global community, i.e., the peoples. This is indicated by the words, "[w]e
the peoples of the United Nations." 30 Thus, the authority for the
international rule of law, and its power to review and supervise the nuclear
weapons problem is an authority not rooted in abstractions like
"sovereignty," "elite," or "ruling class," but in the actualperspectives of the
people of the world community. This means that the peoples' goals,
expressed through appropriate fora, including the United Nations,
governments, as well as public opinion, are critical indicators of the
"principle of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience" as they
relate to the conditions of war (methods and means).
The Charter's second key concept embraces the high purpose of saving
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.3" The drafters clearly did
not envision nuclear war in reference to the concept of war here.
Nonetheless, as the passage contemplates the destructiveness of war, an
enhanced technological capacity for destructive weapons would enhance
the relevance of this provision, not restrict its scope. This reflects a
reasonable legal interpretation.
The third keynote concept is the reference to the "dignity and worth of
the human person."32 In blunt terms, the eradication of millions of human
beings with a single weapon hardly values the dignity or worth of the
person. What is of cardinal legal, political, and moral import is the idea that
international law based on the law of the Charter be interpreted to enhance
the dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be complicit
in the destruction of the core values of human dignity.
The fourth keynote concept in the preamble is emphatically antiimperialist. It holds that the equal rights of all nations must be respected.
The fifth keynote in the Charter preamble refers to the obligation to
respect international law based not only
on treaty commitments, but also on
33
"other sources of international law."
The sixth keynote point in the preamble of the Charter contains a deeply
rooted expectation of progress, improved standards ofliving, and enhanced
' In short, to the extent that we see "legalism" as still
domains of freedom."34
a vital part of law as a discipline, its influence will be moderated by the

30. UN Charter preamble.
31. See id
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. These are abstracted from the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry. See Legality
of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 443 (Weeramantry J., dissenting).The specific summary is taken
from Winston P. Nagan, NuclearArsenals, InternationalLawyers and the Challenge ofMillenium,
24 YALE J. INT'L L. 485, 533-35 (1999).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1

24

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY IN ANAGE OF GLOBALISM

Nagan: Lawyer Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age

recourse to law as "fundamental policy," and the functional idea of law as
a process of authoritative and controlling "decision-making;" guided by a
complex but articulate normative agenda.
X. GLOBALISM AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
One of the most interesting discoveries the domestic practitioner may
encounter in the global context of law as decision-making is how developed
alternative dispute decision-making methods are in the global environment.
For example, apart from adjudication (judicial settlement), well-recognized
methods include negotiation, arbitration, mediation, conciliation, good
offices, enquiry and more (UN Charter, Article 33.1). More than that, the
decision-making emphasis might even inspire an interest in the "anatomy"
ofdecision-making itself as a distinctive field ofinquiry. This could include
a consideration of such articulate decision functions as intelligence,
promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal.
These are challenging ideas that permeate the discourse of international

law. They provide an impressive challenge to the interdisciplinary foci that
is normatively sensitive and might improve our understanding of the role of
lawyers and the challenge of the 21 st century.
The specific emphasis of law as a species of decision-making has been
most insistently promoted in the context of world order studies. It has
focused in terms of theory and method on distinctive intellectual tasks
critical to the "study" and "understanding of legal decision-making in a
world order context. The focus on law as fundamental policy and as
decision-focused made an early appearance in the literature in 1943 in the
well-known article Legal Education and Public Policy. Professional
Trainingin the PublicInterest.3 In that article professional responsibility

is tied to the public interest and the defense of democratic freedom. The
stimulus for the piece grew out of the war-time experience and the fight
against totalitarian fascism. In this piece, lawyer identifications are broader
than conventional chauvinistic or parochially nationalist ones. These
broader, value-conditioned identifications are considered to be critical to
professional responsibility and training in the public interest. The authors
also provide a partial inventory of what practical lawyers do and how in
doing so, they influence or impact the public interest. What is most
important is that these lawyer roles require skills broader than that
sanctioned by legalist paradigms of thought. These include a wide range of
"skills ofthought" (goal thinking, trend thinking, scientific thinking, use of
jural technicality). Other skills included are skills of observation, skills of
management and organization as well as promotional public relations skills.
35. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S.McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 203 (1943).
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It is beyond the scope of this presentation to fully outline how these insights
about role, policy thinking and all related skill components fit into the
culture of law and professional responsibility from a global perspective. But
these are suggestive of the imperative that expectations of professional
responsibility in the future will not be myopic or chauvinist. If it is
grounded in the socio-political reality of globalism then impressive and
enriching opportunities await the evolving role and identifications of
lawyers in the 21st century as they meditate upon the boundaries of
professional responsibility.
XI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Professor Kennedy has most insightfully shown in his recent book,
Freedom From Fear (1999) that the tendency to parochial, chauvinist, even
nativistic identity has a powerful basis in American political culture. Iwould
suggest that narrow identifications have spin-off effects upon legal culture
as well. Americans are not unique in them. However, Americans have in
effect "rejected" the International Court of Justice and have withdrawn
support for the new International Criminal Court. There is still ambivalence
about free trade and immigration. Indeed, the wartime experience indicates
that some Americans still believe participation in both World War I and II
was mistaken. Even that "most unsordid" act of FDR, the lend-lease was
preceded by five "neutrality" acts which in pragmatic terms favored Italian
aggression in Ethiopia and Japanese aggression in China. Isolation is deeply
ingrained in American culture and in some measure, American law. In a
revealing reference Representative Grams suggested that the "new"
International Criminal Court is a "monster." It is, he said, "The monster
that we must slay." He additionally resurrected the key icon of American
isolationist success: The U.S. opposition to and lack of support for the
League of Nations. Perhaps the UN may be on the list for isolationist action
in the future? If one compares Representative Gram's views with the
voluble opposition of Senator Helms to the International Criminal Court
which expresses terms such as "galls me" or "saved the bacon" of states
who now voted "against," or the term "baloney" on the issue of
"aggression," as an international crime, one is reminded of the poet Yeats'
words in the poem "The Second Coming." In this poem Yeats says that the
worst ofus are "full ofpassionate intensity." On the other hand, the Clinton
Administration's timid submission to the passionate intensity of the right
wing tells us as in Yeats' poem, that the best of us, "lack all conviction."
The latest set-back for international responsibility is indicated in the U.S.
Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Senator
Helms was a key power broker in the Senate's defeat of the Treaty. It is
widely conceded that the defeat of the Treaty had less to do with the merits
of the issue, than a concern for partisan advantage. In other words, the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/1
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Senators were incapable of a broader sense of identification with the
survival of the earth-space community, and their sense of political
professional responsibility was correspondingly limited. But the stakes in
these matters are very high since as lawyers we have some choice about
both alternative visions as well as the strategic and tactical deployment of
our resources to realize them. These visions are central to conceptions of
professional role and the depth of professional conviction. A vision of
professional conviction that supports the rule of law in a global
comprehensive sense will seek to vindicate the structure and function ofthe
institutions of humane governance and will be sensitive to the principle that
the foundational values of public and civic virtue are achievable. There is
of course an alternative vision which is the negation of the rule of law. This
other vision is perhaps best expressed in the words of another poet,
Alexander Pope. In his depressing satire, "The Dunciad," Pope wrote:
Lo, thy dread empire chaos is restored,
Light dies before thy uncreating word;
Thy hand, great anarch! lets the curtain fall
And universal darkness buries all. 6
In conclusion, a key challenge to professional responsibility is rooted in
part in the problem of professional identity. How inclusive should a
lawyer's professional identity be in an age of "globalism?" I would suggest
that parochial, insular or even chauvinistic identities might have a
detrimental impact or influence on the lawyers sense ofprofessional identity
and attendant moral and ethical convictions."' A broader concept of
professional identity indeed might be a necessary predicate for a broader or
more expansive conception of the rule of law foundations of professional
responsibility and the moral understandings that this might include. This
might suggest a more searching and comprehensive vision of lawyer roles
and the theories that enlighten us about those roles. Thus the jurisprudence
of lawyer roles viz., the lawyer as a champion of a client, or a

36. ALExANDEhPOPE, THE DuNcIAD 409 (James Sutherland ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd 1943)
(1724).
37. Human beings seem in general to have their identities shaped by the environment as

well as experience with psychological development. The lawyer personality also will be similarly
influenced. These influences may generate parochial and chauvinist or cosmopolitan and perhaps
universalist identities. Charles Kindleberger suggests the following insight from the perspective.
of an economic historian: "Man in his elemental state is a peasant with a possessive love of his
own turf; a mercantilist who favors exports over imports; a populist who distrusts banks,
especially foreign banks; a monopolist who abhors competition; a xenophobe who feels threatened
by strangers and foreigners.... See Charles Kindleberger, InternationalPublic Goods Without
International Governement, 76 AM. ECON. REv., Mar. 1986, at 1.
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3
parabureaucrat in the service of the welfare state, or the lawyer as acolyte, M
or indeed the lawyer as a special purpose "friend" would seem to be a
limited and normatively impoverished discourse outside of the context and
challenges of globalism itself, as well as the idea or ideal of a
comprehensive conception of the rule of law for the larger world
community. That idea or ideal might be quite simply expressed: "Is
professional responsibility and the rule of law informed by an inclusive
commitment to the principle ofhuman dignity on a global basis"? The scope
of professional responsibility and the rule of law is thus an important
discourse about the moral and ethical foundations and justifications of a
learned and important profession. The discourse is important because the
stakes about the rule of law foundations of the kind of public order law
defends and promotes are critical ones.

38. Simon, supra note 3, at 29.
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